Sudan Files: The Unseen - Part 3
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In 2005 the world built a doctrine specifically for this. In 2026 the UN said genocide in the same region. Same armed formations. Twenty years later.
The Responsibility to Protect was adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 on September 16 2005, at the largest gathering of heads of state in history, in direct response to the Darfur genocide of 2003-2008. The ICC issued the first ever arrest warrant for a sitting head of state by the ICC against Omar al-Bashir on March 4 2009. He was never surrendered. In February 2026 the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan concluded that the RSF committed acts showing hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher. The same region. The same armed formations derived from the Janjaweed. Twenty years after the doctrine was adopted specifically because of what happened in this place.
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UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 · September 16 2005 · Responsibility to Protect · Adopted in response to Darfur02 / 07
2005. World leaders adopted the Responsibility to Protect. In direct response to the Darfur genocide already underway.
The 2005 World Summit was the largest ever gathering of heads of state and government in history, convened to mark the 60th anniversary of the United Nations. Its outcome document, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, adopted on September 16 2005, established the Responsibility to Protect in paragraphs 138 and 139. Paragraph 138 states that each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Paragraph 139 states that the international community has the responsibility to use appropriate means to help protect populations when peaceful measures prove inadequate. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, globalr2p.org.
R2P was adopted explicitly in response to the international community's failure to halt the mass atrocities in Rwanda in 1994, the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and Darfur in 2003-2005. The International Crisis Group documented that R2P became the centrepiece of UN reform at the 2005 World Summit and was the most obvious candidate for its first application. That first application was Darfur. The international community conspicuously failed to take the steps necessary to protect the people of Darfur. ICG, Darfur: The International Community's Failure to Protect.
Source: UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, September 16 2005, undocs.org · Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, globalr2p.org · ICG, Darfur: The International Community's Failure to Protect
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ICC arrest warrant · March 4 2009 · Omar al-Bashir · First sitting head of state by the ICC · Never surrendered03 / 07
March 4 2009. The ICC issued the first ever arrest warrant for a sitting head of state. Omar al-Bashir. He was never surrendered.
On March 4 2009, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity committed in Darfur. This was the first warrant of arrest ever issued for a sitting head of state by the ICC. The warrant covered crimes allegedly committed between 2003 and 2008. The UN Security Council had referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC in 2005, making the ICC investigation and the subsequent warrant possible. ICC, icc-cpi.int, March 4 2009.
On July 12 2010, the ICC issued a second arrest warrant for al-Bashir adding three counts of genocide in relation to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups in Darfur. This was also the first genocide charge ever brought by the ICC. Al-Bashir traveled to multiple ICC member states after the warrant was issued, contrary to their obligations. The Security Council, which had referred Darfur to the ICC, consistently failed to ensure al-Bashir's arrest. He was removed from power in the 2019 Sudanese revolution. He has never been surrendered to the ICC. Coalition for the ICC, coalitionfortheicc.org.
Source: ICC, icc-cpi.int, March 4 2009 and July 12 2010 · Coalition for the ICC, al-Bashir case documentation · US Holocaust Memorial Museum, ICC warrant documentation
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El Fasher · North Darfur · Same region · Same pattern · 2003 and 202604 / 07
El Fasher. North Darfur. The same city. The same region. 2003. 2026. Twenty years apart. The same documented pattern.
El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, was at the centre of the Darfur genocide of 2003-2008. The Janjaweed militia, operating with and alongside Sudanese state forces, committed systematic attacks on Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa communities across Darfur, including the North Darfur region surrounding El Fasher. The ICC arrest warrants for al-Bashir specifically cited crimes against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups. R2P was adopted in part as a direct response to what was happening in this region.
Between October 26 2025 and October 27 2025, RSF forces launched an offensive to capture El Fasher, the last major city in Darfur not under RSF control. UN OHCHR documented on February 13 2026 that more than 6,000 people were killed in the first three days of the offensive, with at least 4,400 killed within El Fasher itself and over 1,600 killed along exit routes. UN Human Rights Chief Volker Turk described the unprecedented scale and brutality of the violence. UN OHCHR press release, February 13 2026.
Source: UN OHCHR press release, February 13 2026 · ICG, Darfur genocide documentation 2003-2008 · ICC arrest warrants 2009 and 2010
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UN Fact-Finding Mission · A/HRC/61/77 · February 17 2026 · Hallmarks of genocide · El Fasher05 / 07
February 17 2026. UN report A/HRC/61/77. Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El Fasher. The same region. Again.
The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan published its report A/HRC/61/77, titled Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher, on February 17 2026. The Mission concluded that the RSF and allied militia committed acts against the Zaghawa and Fur communities in El Fasher that show the hallmarks of genocide under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The report documented mass killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, destruction of property and looting in a pattern consistent with an intent to destroy the groups in whole or in part. UN News, February 20 2026.
The Yale School of Public Health published its own analysis on February 19 2026 corroborating the findings. The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention had declared a genocide alert for El Fasher prior to the October 2025 offensive. The pattern documented in 2026 in El Fasher is the same pattern the ICC documented in Darfur between 2003 and 2008. The same armed formations derived from the same Janjaweed militia. The same targeted communities. The same documented methods. Twenty years after R2P was adopted specifically because of what happened in this place.
Source: UN Fact-Finding Mission, A/HRC/61/77, February 17 2026 · UN News, February 20 2026 · Yale School of Public Health, February 19 2026 · Lemkin Institute
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RSF derived from Janjaweed · ICC warrant for Ali Kushayb 2007 · Same formation · Same region06 / 07
The RSF is derived from the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed committed the Darfur genocide. The ICC issued warrants for Janjaweed leaders. The RSF is the same armed formation, reorganised.
The Rapid Support Forces are directly derived from the Janjaweed militia, which committed genocide alongside Sudanese state forces in Darfur between 2003 and 2008. The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Janjaweed commander Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, known as Ali Kushayb, in 2007. Kushayb was charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. He surrendered to the ICC in 2020 and his trial is ongoing. The RSF's commander, General Hemedti, is documented to have commanded Janjaweed units during the Darfur genocide. EU Institute for Security Studies, November 2025.
The doctrine of R2P was built specifically because of what the Janjaweed did in Darfur. The ICC warrant system was applied specifically to Janjaweed leadership. The African Union Mission in Sudan was deployed specifically because of Darfur. None of it dismantled the formation. Twenty years later the same formation, reorganised as the RSF, is operating in the same region committing acts the UN has concluded show the hallmarks of genocide. The Georgetown Journal of International Law documented the ICC-Security Council accountability gap that made this outcome possible. Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2022.
Source: ICC, Ali Kushayb case documentation, icc-cpi.int · EU Institute for Security Studies, November 4 2025 · Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2022
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The question. Not a claim. Series final episode tomorrow.07 / 07
R2P adopted 2005 because of Darfur. ICC warrant 2009, first ever for a sitting head of state. He was never surrendered. February 2026: genocide concluded in the same region by the same formations. When a doctrine is built specifically for a situation and the situation repeats in the same place, what does that tell us about the doctrine?
Tomorrow: the series closes. Not with the destruction. With the people still there. The Emergency Response Rooms still operating. Radio Dabanga still broadcasting. Ayin Network still documenting. The displaced still counted by the IOM DTM. Sudan Files: The Unseen. Series final.
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